A CRITIQUE OF WIREDU’S CONCEPT OF TRUTH

ABSTRACT
Wiredu’s recent significant contribution to epistemology reviews the relationship between knowledge, truth and existence. In this theory Kwasi Wiredu attempts to refute the supposition that truth is a relation the supposition that truth is a relation between statements about the world and the world itself. He argues against objectivist claims to knowledge i.e, that knowledge is of a thing as it is in itself and that appearance is different from opinion. Wiredu argues against the attempts to distinguish between truth of opinion and truth of knowledge and the position by which Wiredu institutes his thesis is a claim that “Truth is an opinion”. He calls this a special case of general proposition that has to be apprehended. In this essay, my main contention is that Kwasi Wiredu is identifying truth with opinion, fails to give a true account of human reality because his thesis discards completely the distinction that should be obtained between truth and opinion, thereby making falsehood impossible, and truth subjective.